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i
Abstract
This thesis seeks to construct an ethical course of action for concurrent surgery, a
practice brought into the public eye by The Boston Globe, which argued against allowing
one attending surgeon to oversee two cases on separate patients in different operating
rooms. First, the common morality and its four main principles relevant to biomedical
ethics will be described which will be subsequently used to show that concurrent surgery
is allowed according to non-violation of the principle of non-maleficence through current
empirical evidence, and supported by the principle of beneficence and justice. Next, the
principle of respect for autonomy will be shown to require informed consent in order to
ensure proper patient understanding of the nature of the procedure. This thesis will end
by discussing the current public, hospital, and political reactions to the debate in order to
summarize current accordance with this thesis’ ethical argument and propose informed
recommendations to doctors, hospitals, and law makers, as discussed in the conclusion.
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1
Introduction

In October of 2015, the Boston Globe Spotlight Team released an extensive story,
called “Clash in the Name of Care,” based on an investigation into the practice of
concurrent surgeries at Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH).1 Concurrent surgeries
occur when one physician is simultaneously attending two or more surgeries on different
patients in different operating rooms. This controversial practice occurs in a minority of
all surgeries, and is almost exclusively limited to high profile surgeons in teaching
hospitals such as MGH. Although the practice has been around for decades, the debate on
the both the ethics and the practicality of the technique is only now firing up thanks in
part to this report.
The Boston Globe news story, as well as internal emails and interviews of
patients and doctors supporting both sides of the issue, tell the tale of Tony Meng, a
patient who underwent a cervical corpectomy to remove parts of degenerating vertebra in
his neck. The surgery included removal of several pieces of cervical vertebrae from the
anterior side of the neck before Meng was flipped and operated on posteriorly. During
this complicated eleven-hour-long surgery, nerve function between Meng’s brain and
lower abdomen began to fade. As his surgeon, Doctor Kirkham Wood, pressed on with
the procedure, nerve function did not improve. When Meng woke up, he was paralyzed
from the neck down, a risk he acknowledged he knew about beforehand during the
informed consent process. During litigation, however, he learned that his surgery
overlapped with another spinal surgery on a woman in an adjacent operating room with
1

J. Abelson et al. "Clash In The Name of Care." Boston Globe, October 25, 2015,
accessed May 3, 2017, https://apps.bostonglobe.com/spotlight/clash-in-the-name-ofcare/story/.
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Dr. Wood also as the attending physician. An attending physician, or just “attending,” is
the head surgeon who has ultimate responsibility and control over a case. In fact, seven
hours of Meng’s eleven-hour surgery overlapped with this patient. Although Dr. Wood
was physically present for the specialized part of the surgery during which the paralysis
complication occurred, he never informed Meng beforehand that his surgery ran
concurrently with another, a fact that Meng claimed would have influenced his decision
to undergo the surgery in the first place. This became the major argument in Meng’s
malpractice suit against Dr. Wood.
Dr. Wood and his legal team argued that nothing in the medical record indicated
that the complication was caused by Dr. Wood not being present. Furthermore, neither
common practice in the field nor legal precedent required the concurrency of a surgery to
be disclosed in the informed consent process. In addition, the president of Massachusetts
General claimed in an interview with The Boston Globe that the hospital has never found
a case where the use of concurrency has caused harm; however, this hospital review has
not been published.2
The investigative report of the Boston Globe, in addition to presenting the
individual case of Mr. Meng and Doctor Wood, includes arguments both for and against
the practice of concurrent surgeries. Proponents of concurrent surgery say that the
practice increases hospital efficiency and access to expert medical specialists without
subtracting from quality of care. Furthermore, this practice is especially important in
large teaching hospitals like MGH because of the pressing need to train fellows and
residents. By allowing multiple procedures with the same attending physician, one highly
trained professional can theoretically instruct twice as many trainees. It is important for
2

Ibid.
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future leaders in healthcare, specifically residents and fellows, to learn from these unique
cases, especially when only a handful of individuals have the ability to perform complex
procedures like Meng’s surgery. This, coupled with the fact that double-booking can
distribute top medical care to up to twice as many people with no demonstrated increased
risk for negative patient outcomes, makes the use of concurrent surgeries seem like an
easy choice.
However, opponents say that concurrent surgery carries an inherent risk to the
patient even if limited research into actual risk indicates safety. Patients that are doublebooked may have increased time under anesthesia, for example, and of course, it is
possible that the attending surgeon in charge will not be immediately present if the
patient experiences unexpected complications during a concurrent surgery. Judgment of
risks aside, opponents claim that patients still have a right to know if physicians, to whom
they give permission to operate, have divided attention and responsibility during surgery.
This case and others broken by the Boston Globe Spotlight Team ask important
questions about the safety, morality, and legal backing of concurrent surgeries. Hospitals,
patients, and the press have been quick to offer answers. Massachusetts General has
responded by offering a website which explains the need for concurrent surgeries and
publicizes the hospital’s official perioperative policy on concurrent surgeries.3 Reasons to
operate concurrently mirror those of the wider medical community. These reasons
include trauma, citing the hospital’s response to the Boston Marathon bombing, optimal
use of operating rooms and surgical teams, access to leading physicians, timeliness of
care, and education of residents and fellows. The hospital’s perioperative policy
3

"Concurrent/Overlapping Surgery," Massachusetts General Hospital. accessed
February 12, 2017, http://www.massgeneral.org/overlapping-surgery/.
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highlights expectations of the attending and the surgical team, including specification of
where the attending can or cannot be. It explicitly prohibits three overlapping surgeries.
However, it is important to note that this policy includes nothing about the need to
disclose concurrency in the informed consent process.
It is important to realize the two separate yet equally important questions to be
analyzed in this debate: should concurrent surgeries be allowed, and secondly, do
concurrent surgeries need informed consent of the patient? First, I will show that
concurrent surgery is generally permissible. Secondly, I will argue that although
concurrent surgery is a valid medical practice, informed consent by the patient is always
required except in certain emergency situations.
In my first chapter, I will introduce the moral principles at play in the question of
concurrent surgeries and informed consent, including beneficence, nonmaleficence,
justice, and respect for autonomy, and I will argue that concurrent surgery should be
allowed based on the principles of nonmaleficence and justice. In my second chapter, I
will show that informed consent is needed for concurrent surgery in order to fulfill the
moral principle of respect for autonomy. Lastly, in my third chapter, I will highlight and
discuss the current response to the increased attention to concurrent surgery induced by
the Boston Globe report. The response of the public, government agencies, hospitals, and
professional organizations will show the current direction of the practice.

5
Chapter 1: Moral Principles and Concurrent Surgery

To decide the proper action for both the practice of concurrent surgery and
informed consent for those surgeries, it is important to first establish the moral principles
related to these questions. These moral principles will become the moral foundation upon
which concurrent surgery and consent for it will stand. In the beginning of this chapter, I
will set up this moral foundation by showing how moral principles arise from a universal
morality called the common morality. I will end by showing that concurrent surgery is
permissible according to the principle of nonmaleficence and warranted according to the
moral principle of justice.

Moral Background: The Common Morality and Moral Principle

Arguments using an ethical framework such as the one used here must begin with
a definition of ethics and morality. Morality can be used both descriptively and
normatively. Descriptive morality is simply a description of a body of standards and
principles accepted by a particular group of people or an individual, while normative
morality is a code of conduct that should be accepted under particular conditions by all
rational persons.1 Ethics, specifically normative ethics, is a type of philosophy that
attempts to determine moral codes of conducts and justifications for those courses of

1

Bernard Gert and Joshua Gert, "The Definition of Morality," The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2016, accessed February 19, 2017,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
spr2016/entries/morality-definition/.
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action.2 Thus, this discussion on concurrent surgery and informed consent is an ethical
discussion because I am attempting to provide a specific course of action for the practice
and consent of concurrent surgery.
Within any morality are principles and rules which together lead to moral action.
Moral principles are common but non-specific values of right and wrong within morality.
For example, the principle of respect for autonomy implies that one should respect
another’s freedom to choose one's own destiny. However, this principle does not give a
direct pathway to a specific action, and leaves only a general description of the “right”
thing to do, which in the case of medical ethics, is to act so that you always respect the
autonomy of the patient. Thus, moral principles do not specify particular actions.3
Moral rules specify and focus this moral pathway to particular action. For
example, respect for autonomy leads to the specific rule, “respect the autonomy of
patients by following their advance directive.” This is a type of rule known as a
substantive rule, or a rule which applies a moral principle to an action. Other types of
rules involve authority rules, which determine who has the capacity to make decisions
and/or perform them, and procedural rules, which establish a guideline of actions to be
followed in a particular circumstance. For example, the rules for distributing scarce
medical resources, like organ transplants, are procedural rules.4
In addition, moral principles imply moral virtues, which are ideal character traits
of a moral person who accepts, upholds, and acts according to the corresponding moral
principle. For example, benevolence is the character trait of a person who upholds and
2

Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 7th ed.,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1.
3
Ibid., 13-14.
4
Ibid., 14-15.
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practices the principle of beneficence. Many virtues together make up a character of a
moral person.5
With the terms used in this discussion of informed consent defined, I will now go
on to explain the common morality, which will be used to analyze concurrent surgery and
consent.
The common morality is the set of moral norms which are universal across all
societies, cultures, religions, and moral theories. While each of these many moralities can
be the subject of descriptive morality, the common morality is a code of conduct which
should be accepted by all rational persons. Therefore, the common morality is not merely
a morality; it is the set of norms shared by all persons committed to morality, no matter
their particular societal background.6
In other words, across the diverse array of the societies, cultures, religions, and
philosophical traditions of humanity, there are some basic moral principles which each
society generally accepts as true and good. Although different cultures and societies may
have different justifications for these moral principles and have different interpretations
on how to achieve the principles’ goals, the principles themselves remain constant no
matter the context within any particular morality. This means that the principles which
make up the common morality are not exhaustive; a particular morality has unique norms
and principles not found other moralities (after all, this uniqueness is part of what
distinguishes a particular morality from any other). However, no morality contains norms
which violate the common morality, and thus the common morality remains universal. 7

5
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It is important to note that these principles not only exist across cultures and
societies, but across the most prominent normative moral theories as well, although the
principles are substantiated and confirmed differently by each. For example, beneficence,
to do good to another, is a universal moral principle because it is accepted as right by all
people who are serious and committed to being moral people. Different moral theories
may have different reasons for being beneficent, but all accept beneficence. For example,
utilitarianism claims that one must be beneficent because it generally increases the
overall happiness of many people, while a deontologist requires beneficence simply
because it is the right thing to do - it is an a priori duty. Similar arguments exist for any
other moral principle within the common morality.
Importantly, as I apply principles of the common morality to concurrent surgery
with rules and specifications, the common morality may not validly extend at every step
along the way. Similar to Beauchamp and Childress, I do not imply that all of my
applications of the principles of the common morality absolutely claim the authority of
the common morality.8 However, because I start from these universal principles, my
argued-for actions at least attempt to achieve the same universal good that all cultures and
normative ethical theories accept, which gives those actions justification through their
starting point.
To provide specificity, here are some rules of the common morality: do not kill,
do not cause pain of others, prevent harm, tell the truth, allow others to make their own
decisions, and do not steal. These rules entail virtues which are universally accepted as

8
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admired character traits: nonmalevolence, honesty, integrity, and kindness, to name a
few.9
Although many more principles, rules, and virtues can be added to the common
morality, four moral principles of the common morality have been determined as
especially relevant to biomedical ethics and they form the ethical discussion on
concurrent surgery and informed consent. These are nonmaleficence, the goal of not
harming another; beneficence, the goal of increasing the welfare of another; justice, the
goal of distributing risk, harm, and good fairly across a group of people; and respect for
autonomy, the goal of not interfering with another’s ability to make their own decisions
and to choose their own destiny. As stated earlier, all four of these are principles under
common morality and are thus universal and applicable within medicine to every patient
and physician.10
However, although these moral principles are universal, because different cultures
and societies have different interpretations and justifications for these basic moral
principles, cultures may weigh these and other moral principles differently. This may lead
to different substantive, authority, and procedural rules and customs across cultures, each
equally valid in ensuring their respective moral principles. For example, research has
shown that Asian groups have a greater tendency to make collective medical decisions
than Americans, who are more individualistic. For example, Asian and Pacific Islanders
are more likely to defer or share a decision with another family member, to think of
elderly family members first when making medical decions about themselves, and be less

9
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Ibid., 13.
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willing to decide against family wishes.11 This is a greater emphasis on care of family
than respect for individual autonomy, highlighting differences in the application of moral
principles across cultures. For example, an Asian patient may wish to consult with his or
her family about concurrent surgery more than an American patient. I will not address
how my response to concurrent surgery may specifically change in different cultural
contexts, but I do propose that my argument for concurrent surgery and consent may need
to be further modified to include different cultural particularities.
I will argue that these four principles of common morality can be applied to the
case of concurrent surgery and informed consent in order to yield a clear, consistent,
universal course of action that is based in the universality of the common morality. In this
chapter, I will show that the practice of concurrent surgery is permissible according to the
principle of nonmaleficence and beneficence, and that the principle of justice supports the
use of concurrent surgeries. I will use empirical evidence to back up these claims. In the
next chapter, I will apply the principle of autonomy derived from the common morality to
show that informed consent is required for these concurrent surgeries.

Nonmaleficence and Concurrent Surgery

Here, I will show that concurrent surgery is permissible by examining two of the
principles of the common morality, nonmaleficence and beneficence, which get at the
heart of the responsibility of a doctor for his or her patient. Nonmaleficence and
beneficence arise out of the general responsibility of a doctor to promote the general
11

Linda A. McLaughlin and Kathryn L. Braun, "Asian and Pacific Islander Cultural
Values: Considerations for Health Care Decision Making," Health & Social Work 23, no.
2 (1998): 116-126.
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welfare of his or her patients.12 This theme of promoting the welfare of others stems from
the common morality. In the case of a doctor-patient relationship, this general welfare is
carried out through the promotion of health by cure or prevention of disease in a patient.
This is described in the Hippocratic Oath as “help, or at least, do not harm.”13 This phrase
of the Hippocratic Oath can further be broken down into four main elements: (1) One
ought not to harm, (2) One ought to prevent harm, (3) One ought to remove harm, and (4)
One ought to do good.14
From here, these elements crystallize into beneficence and nonmaleficence based
on the negative and positive duties that they entail. The first element, to do no harm, is a
negative duty because the physician must refrain from acting in a harmful way, the first
consideration in the justification of any medical action. This is nonmaleficence. The
second, third and fourth elements all require actions of the doctor, and therefore imply
positive duties and fall under the umbrella of beneficence.
Therefore, any medical decision must be determined by weighing the medical
outcomes against these two principles. When a procedure has a double effect, when it has
both a positive outcome and negative side effects, these competing interests must be
balanced according to the doctor’s duty of beneficence, to promote the well-being of a
patient through a good treatment, and nonmaleficence, the duty to not harm the patient
through adverse side effects.15 The majority of medical treatments have both positive and
negative effects, and therefore concern both duties. For example, a blood draw causes
12

William K. Frankena, Ethics, 2nd ed., (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1973), 47.
13
Ludwig Edelstein, The Hippocratic Oath, Text, Translation and Interpretation,
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1943), Supplement 1.
14
Ruth R. Faden, and Tom L. Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed
Consent, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 10.
15
Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 20-22.
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pain and carries a small risk of infection, but also has the potential to provide data for
accurate diagnoses.
According to this weighing analogy, a procedure is permitted, (neither required
nor forbidden) if there are neither positive nor negative outcomes, or if the positive and
negative outcomes completely cancel each other out (the weighing is neutral). A
procedure is required if positive outcomes exist while negative outcomes do not, or if
positive outcomes outweigh the negative outcomes (the weighing is net positive).
The practice of concurrent surgery, like any other medical procedure, must be
shown to be morally required, or at least permitted, by weighing the medical outcomes
according to the above process. However, when the effects of concurrent surgeries are
limited to an individual patient, concurrent surgery only carries risk, and does not have
the potential to benefit one particular patient. Nothing about having one’s surgeon attend
to another patient simultaneously could possibly benefit that one patient’s medical
outcome. In other words, an overlapped surgery offers no outcome-based medical benefit
to an individual person compared to a non-overlapped surgery. No doubt, positive
outcomes do exist for overlapping surgeries, as will be shown later, but these beneficial
outcomes only arise once a system of multiple patients is considered. Therefore, the
outcomes of concurrent surgery to an individual patient do not concern the moral
principle of beneficence because there is no opportunity for concurrency to benefit an
individual.
Thus, it follows that the principle of beneficence does not influence the
permissibility of concurrent surgery. With no individual positive outcomes, for
concurrent surgery to be permitted, it will have to be shown that there are also no

13
negative outcomes associated with concurrent surgery. According to the principle of
nonmaleficence, concurrent surgery will need to show neither medical harm nor risk for
the practice to bepermitted. If concurrent surgery is shown to have a high risk of harming
the patient, then the action of concurrent surgery and the duty to uphold the principle of
nonmaleficence are in conflict, and the practice itself is not permitted and is forbidden.
Not surprisingly, it is easy to think of potential risks of an overlapped surgery
compared to a non-overlapped one. If a surgical complication occurs, the attending
surgeon could be delayed in getting back to the operating room because he or she is with
another patient. This can be exacerbated when the second operation is difficult or out of
the immediate vicinity. Furthermore, this requires the attending to leave the second
patient, potentially leaving this patient under anesthesia for longer than expected or
necessary.16 To be able to connect these potential risks to the principle of
nonmaleficence, the actual empirical negative outcomes associated with these risks must
be used to determine the actual risk of harm that concurrent surgery carries which will
then show the moral acceptability of overlapping surgery. Only if the procedure
objectively does no or very little harm to the patient does the practice become permissible
under the principle of nonmaleficence.

Nonmaleficence and Concurrent Surgery: Empirical Evidence

Current evidence shows that concurrent surgeries do not lead to negative patient
outcomes, and therefore concurrent surgeries are permissible under the principle of
16

Michelle M. Mello and Edward H. Livingston, “Managing the Risks of Concurrent
Surgeries,” JAMA 315, no. 15 (2016), 1563-1564; Alexander Langerman, “Concurrent
Surgery and Informed Consent,” JAMA Surgery 151, no. 7 (2016), 601-602.
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nonmaleficence and the weighing process described above.
One leading study on the matter, which took place over two years and involved
3,600 thoracic surgeries of 20 types, showed no statistical difference in operating length
between concurrent and nonconcurrent surgeries for 17 of those surgery types. Only one
type of surgery had an increase in operating time with concurrency and two groups
actually took statistically less time to operate than if the surgery was concurrent. This
study also compared medical complications in the concurrent and nonconcurrent groups,
and found no increased occurrence of risk-adjusted outcomes for concurrent surgeries in
any of the 20 groups.17 Risk-adjusted outcomes mean that for each, the inherent
probability of negative outcomes was adjusted so that all types of surgeries could be
compared to each other independently of their natural differences in risk.
It should be noted that this study has a few major limitations, one being that it
only evaluates thoracic surgery and leaves out other types like orthopedic, abdominal,
and neurological surgery, all of which are commonly double-booked in teaching
hospitals. In addition, the study made no distinction between surgeries that overlapped for
only a few minutes in the beginning and the end (where a resident usually makes the
opening and closing maneuvers anyway) and surgeries that completely overlap with
another. Both of these aspects are important to the case study of Mr. Meng, described in
the introduction, as his surgery was both orthopedic and had full overlap with another
surgery. Here, a fully overlapped surgery occurs when the attending surgeon is
17

KW Yount, JR Gillen, IL Kron et al., “Attendings Performing Simultaneous
Operations in Academic Cardiothoracic Surgery Does not Increase Operative Duration or
Negatively Affect Patient Outcomes,” paper presented at AATS annual meeting, April
25–29, 2015, Seattle, WA, accessed November 1, 2016,
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overseeing two or more surgeries for the entire duration of one surgery, and not just
during the opening and closing. Again, this is the type of concurrent surgery that I am
most concerned with. Furthermore, this study has not yet been published in a scholarly
journal and has thus not yet been peer-reviewed, which requires an increased caution in
drawing strong conclusions. Finally, this study is the most extensive statistical study on
concurrent surgery to date, and the results have not yet been repeated, which is important
in the process of the scientific method. Therefore, this study only tentatively indicates
that concurrent surgeries are no less dangerous than individual surgeries.
Another study of a different type also showed that concurrent procedures are
feasible. This study, instead of depending entirely on past patient data, used a simulation
of patient flow. This simulation used statistical parameters from the real data of operation
teams to predict the flow of patients through those same operation teams operating
concurrently or nonconcurrently. Since the simulation was based on real data from the
Duke Medical Center Endoscopy Unit, meaning that its results are tied to actual
observation and have real-world implications. When physicians were allowed to attend
two operating rooms at once, the results of this study did not show an increase in the
amount of time in the operating room, nor an increase in patient waiting time compared
to a model where physicians attended one operating room at a time.18
However, this study is limited because it is mainly an analysis on medical team
and nurse placement and does not explicitly simulate changes between a physician
overseeing one operating room or two. In addition, this study only describes one type of
specialty – simple endoscopic procedures. Concurrent surgeries with full overlap are
18

Javad Taheri et al., “A Simulation Study to Reduce Nurse Overtime and Improve
Patient Flow Time at a Hospital Endoscopy Unit,” Proceedings of the 2012 Winter
Simulation Conference (WSC), IEEE, 2012.
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usually much more complex and serious. Therefore, it is tough to draw strong
conclusions from this study, although it does indicate a general acceptability of the
practice of concurrent surgery.
Doctors also assert that concurrent surgery, when ran by a highly skilled and
experienced operating room team, increases the efficiency of surgery. In the commentary
section of an article which found a lower mortality rate using video-assisted pulmonary
lobectomy techniques than thoracotomies, the author in response to a question on
morbidity and mortality explains that he believes that his procedure’s success is partially
due to the efficiency of his operations.19 That is, he can perform 6-10 surgeries a day
when they are overlapped, and the experience his team has accrued doing these surgeries
this quickly has improved patient outcomes. Certainly, a report of favorable results is
evidence against adverse outcomes. It is important to note, however, that this anecdotal
evidence is just that - a reasonable opinion not backed up by empirical scientific analysis.
Therefore, its support for the safety of concurrent surgery should be considered tentative.
Studies and discussions in the current literature on the viability of concurrent
surgery viability end here. Although the practice of concurrent surgery has been the
standard of care in many teaching hospitals for decades, it is only in the very recent past
that researchers have begun to examine the practice with a scientific eye. Although highprofile investigative reports like the Boston Globe’s and lawsuits like Mr. Meng’s may
speed up future focus on the topic via public response, the need for more objective data
and input on this issue is essential.

19

Robert J. McKenna, Ward Houck, and Clark Beeman Fuller, “Video-assisted
Thoracic Surgery Lobectomy: Experience with 1,100 Cases,” The Annals of Thoracic
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Indeed, opinion articles largely written in response to the recent public attention
agree that current evidence around concurrent surgery does not suggest adverse
outcomes; however, they also claim that further investigation on concurrent outcomes
compared to those of non-concurrent operations is still of great importance, and “is a
knowledge gap worthy of funded health services research.” 20 However, until this
confirmation is complete, ethicists and doctors must look at the evidence available today,
and this evidence suggests that the potential risks, including increased operating time,
time under anesthesia, and increased possibility for complications, do not translate into
significant adverse outcomes compared to non-concurrent operations. Therefore, the
practice of concurrent surgery does not violate the principle of nonmaleficence, at least
with knowledge available today.
In summary, throughout the studies and articles above, there is only evidence,
albeit tentative, that concurrent surgery is not associated with an increased risk of harm.
Furthermore, there is no evidence showing that concurrent surgery increases risks
compared to non-concurrent surgery. With no evidence of negative outcomes, the
principle of nonmaleficence is not violated and thus the concurrent surgery according to
the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence is permitted according to the common
morality.
It is important to note that for now, concurrent surgery is permitted, and not yet
ethically required. To be required, there has to be a concrete benefit, or increase in
“good,” caused by concurrency. In other words, now that concurrent surgery is permitted,
20

Mello and Livingston, “Managing the Risks,” 1563-1564; Georgia M. Beasley,
Theodore N. Pappas, and Allan D. Kirk, “Procedure Delegation by Attending Surgeons
Performing Concurrent Operations in Academic Medical Centers: Balancing Safety and
Efficiency,” Annals of Surgery 261, no. 6 (2015), 1044-1045.
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there is no reason not to allow overlapped surgery, but there is not yet a reason to allow
it.

Justice, Collective Beneficence, and Concurrent Surgery

After concluding that concurrent surgery is allowed under the moral principle of
nonmaleficence because it does not produce substantial medical risk to the patient, I will
now show how the principles of justice and beneficence create reasons for the practice. .
As stated, nonmaleficence has only proven permitability; it is justice and beneficence that
validate the practice and justify it. . Justice and beneficence provide positive outcomes to
concurrent surgery and establish the “good” of the procedure; this justifies its practice.
The moral principles of justice and beneficence can be thought of as increasing
the greater good to those receiving and in need of receiving medical care through an
increase in the amount of good action and fair distribution of that action. While
beneficence exists to increase the good of a single patient or a collection of people,
justice is the equal, fair, or due distribution of benefit and risk to a collection of people.21
Overlapping surgery is specifically concerned with the distribution of medical benefit,
and not risk. As I will show, there are two main ways the greater good is increased from
concurrent surgery: increased patient access to doctors, and increased training of future
medical professionals including medical students, residents, and fellows.22
The first benefit of concurrent surgery is the increased number of patients who
can receive care from one physician. This is collective beneficence as a collection of
21
22

Faden and Beauchamp, History and Theory, 14-15.
Mello and Livingston, “Managing the Risks,” 1563-1564.

19
patients are receiving more care, and thus the general good is increased. This is the
benefit with the most direct impact on the current patient population, as it is not reliant on
future medical access resulting from the training of future professionals. Increasing
access to doctors becomes especially important once it is understood that the doctors who
perform concurrent surgery are frequently the most renowned doctors in their specialties
and have the expertise to tackle the most serious, delicate, and rare cases. With increased
specialization in the medical field, it is now very much possible, and even common, for a
handful of doctors to be the only ones in the nation qualified to perform these special
cases. There is, therefore, an even greater need to maximize the number of patients that
these top doctors can treat.
The literature supports this idea. One opinion article in the Journal of the
American Medical Association argues that by increasing access to sought-after surgeons,
concurrent surgery could help avoid life-threatening delays resulting from long patient
waiting lines and overall low access.23 According to the rules of supply and demand,
increased patient access will also drive up “supply” for these procedures, which could
lower costs of care. With surgery more affordable, public access also increases as more
people are able to afford care.
Quantitative evidence supports these opinions by showing this increased patient
access. Computer models based on real operating data from nine surgeons showed that
parallel processing of patients increased the average number of surgeries done by each
surgeon per day by 0.42. Here parallel processing occurs when two operating rooms
prepare patients in an alternating fashion so that one attending physician can switch
between two operating rooms to work on the critical parts of each procedure. The
23
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opening and closing are done while the attending is in the critical portion in the other
operating room, hence parallel processing is a type of concurrent surgery. Since real data
was used from different surgeons, this study shows that parallel processing increased
efficiency no matter the operating style of the surgeon, where each could have unique
methods of closure, opening, and technique.24
In another study focusing on uncomplicated hernia repairs, room turnover times
were reduced 45% when these same parallel processing techniques were used.25 It is
important to note here that these studies examined relatively uncomplicated surgeries;
one study only used regional anesthetic, and the other study focused on routine hernia
repair. Even though these specifically do not address high profile, high risk concurrent
surgeries, these studies generally show that concurrent surgery does indeed increase
efficiency and thus patient access, thereby lending concrete support to concurrent surgery
in other areas like highly specialized surgeries in teaching hospitals.
The second benefit of concurrent surgery is the increased ability to train the next
generation of medical professionals by delegating responsibility and providing supervised
practice opportunities to residents and fellows.26 This provides the opportunity for high
quality care of future patients because future attending surgeons are trained. An increase
in the amount of future surgeries is an increase in collective beneficence. In addition,
justice has the potential to be increased because this increased ability to treat future
patients could be distributed equally and fairly to more people within the population. This
24
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might help ensure equal distribution of care in the near future. This however is only a
possibility to increase justice because the larger amount of surgeries could be distributed
unfairly, such as only to those that can pay for surgery.
In the current training of these persons, medical schools are associated with a
teaching hospital, and these hospitals also provide residencies and fellowships for
medical students. Residents gradually take on more and more complex cases and are
given more independence as they move through the four years of their program, while
fellows are trained to be able to take on any general case in their specialty. They only
need to learn the most complex cases and procedures from the top attending doctors to be
able to operate on the most complicated cases. In both cases, it is easy to see how
increased patient throughput will also increase exposure to these trainees and even make
it possible to train more people. With the already apparent low access to these top
doctors, training more people to be at the top level through the use of concurrent
surgeries will only increase capacity, and will thus allow more people to benefit. In
addition, these residents and fellows are fully trained to be able to perform opening,
closing, and non-critical portions of their assigned procedures. The patient is never left
alone with unqualified doctors even in concurrent surgeries.
As touched upon, it is important to note that because of the uncertainty of the
future, justice-based benefit of more equally distributed care is only possible and is not
guaranteed. Even if concurrency increases the training of and access to future
professionals, concurrency may still not uphold the principle of justice through more
equal distribution because future healthcare systems could not distribute their increased
capacity for care evenly. They might only provide their medical care to the rich, for
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example. However, increased training now does certainly allow the possibility for an
increase in justice later though more equal distribution even if it does not guarantee it.
Thus, there is still a potential benefit in justice through concurrent surgery.
No matter the actual increase in justice, however, simple increase in future
number of surgeries no matter the distribution is still an increase in collective beneficence
if the number of patients in need remains constant. This is because the number of treated
future patients would still increase through greater training even if distribution would not.
All in all, both the increase in collective beneficence and the potential for increased
justice-based distribution justifies the practice of concurrent surgery despite its
limitations.
Therefore, the justification of concurrent surgery is accomplished through an
increased capacity to treat more patients by a) increasing efficiency and patient load of
doctors, especially highly specialized ones, b) by increasing the capacity to train future
medical professionals which increases access to medical procedures in the future, and c)
by creating the possibility for more equal distribution of medical care in the future. All of
these increase the greater good by either increased population treatment or more fairly
distributed health care procedures.
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Chapter 2: The Requirement of Informed Consent

In Chapter One, I introduced the common morality and established the importance
of the four moral principles to medical ethics: beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice, and
respect for autonomy. After application of these moral principles to the practice of
concurrent surgery, I showed that the practice was allowed according to the principle of
nonmaleficence and beneficence, and that the practice was valid according to the fairness
it may cause under the principle of justice and the good it causes under the principle of
collective beneficence, or good for more people. Now, I will show that common
morality’s moral principle of respect for autonomy requires informed consent.
To arrive at this conclusion, I will first establish three key requirements of an
autonomous action: intentionality, understanding, and non-control. Then, I will show that
the five elements of informed consent - disclosure, comprehension, voluntariness,
competence, and consent - ensure that the action of informed consent is also an
autonomous action as defined by the three elements of autonomous action. With these
five elements established, I will apply each to the practice of concurrent surgery to show
that concurrency must be included in the consent process.

The Essential Elements of Autonomous Action and Informed Consent

To apply the common morality’s moral principle of the respect for autonomy, the
term “autonomy” must be defined. Here, autonomy is taken to be the capacity for one to
live one’s own life according to the reasons and motives that are taken to be one’s own,
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and not the result of outside manipulating or distorting forces.1 This concept applied to a
patient considering undergoing a medical procedure means that an autonomous patient
would choose to undergo or to not undergo a medical procedure according to his or her
own reasons or motives. These would not be unduly influenced by any outside
manipulating or distorting forces, including from the doctor, family, friends, or
acquaintances. Specifically focusing on the doctor-patient relationship, the actions of the
doctor should not unduly manipulate or distort a patient’s own decision to undergo
medical treatment.
Next, it is important to note that this definition of autonomy describes an ideal
case. Faden and Beauchamp claim that this ideal definition of autonomy places large
undue expectations upon a patient. An ideally autonomous person is “consistent,
independent, in command, resistant to control by authorities, and the source of his or her
basic values and beliefs.”2 A problem arises here because this ideal standard would
render most choosers and most choices not fully autonomous - the requirements are
simply too high.
The moral principle of respect for autonomy overcomes this problem in an
important way. Respect for autonomy does not require a person to guarantee and verify
that the choice of another is autonomous to this ideal standard. The principle of respect
for autonomy, first, requires one to act as though another has a capacity for autonomy
and, second, requires one to assume that another is using their autonomy to do an
autonomous action. This requirement respects the ability and capacity others to be
autonomous, but does not require someone to ensure that others are ideally autonomous
1

John Christman, "Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy," The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, spring 2015, accessed February 21, 2017.
2
Faden and Beauchamp, A History and Theory, 236.

25
all the time, which would be impossible. Hence, the principle is only respect for the
autonomy of others, and does not include the need to ensure that others are fully
autonomous.
Secondly, respect for autonomy and informed consent considers the autonomous
action of a patient, and less so the autonomy of the patient himself or herself. Here, there
is a clear distinction between the autonomous choice and the autonomous chooser,. This
effectively focuses the debate of informed consent and concurrent surgery on actions of
autonomy, and not the person that is doing that action.3

In terms of autonomous

action, it can be said that a person acts autonomously only if a person acts in three ways:
(1), intentionally, (2) with understanding, and (3) without controlling influences.4 Firstly,
for an action to be intentional it needs to be “willed according to a plan” and therefore
this action is either intentional or unintentional and is not on a spectrum.5 A person either
wills an action according to a plan or does not will an action according to a plan; one
cannot only partly will an action according to a plan. In the case of consenting to a
medical procedure, a patient can either intend for the procedure to be done, or not intend
it to be done, and cannot only partly intend to undergo the procedure.
Furthermore, an action is not autonomous if it is unintended. To illustrate this
point, consider the example of person accidentally knocking over a glass of water onto a
coworker’s paperwork. This action is not an autonomous action because the person did
not intend to spill the water; he or she did not will this action according to a plan.
Therefore, this action is not autonomous.
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In addition, this example also illustrates my above distinction between
autonomous action and autonomous persons. Here, the action was not autonomous, even
though the person who spilled the water could have been an autonomous person. Clearly,
autonomous choices and autonomous choosers are different. I look at autonomous action
specifically in my discussion on informed consent because I am attempting to ensure that
the decision to undergo a concurrent operation is an autonomous choice; I am not
concerned with ensuring that the patient undergoing the operation is or is not an
autonomous person.
The second condition of an autonomous action is understanding. A person needs
to have understanding of an action itself in order to make a genuine evaluation of that
action’s relation to that person’s beliefs and reasons. Here, a substantially understood
action is one where a person has adequate apprehension of all the relevant propositions or
statements that correctly describe (1) the nature of the action, and (2) the foreseeable
consequences of and possible outcomes that might follow as the result of performing or
not performing the action.6
Note that understanding, unlike intentionality, is on a spectrum. Things can be
less understood or more understood, and there is not a discrete separation between
understanding and non-understanding. In addition, a person does not need to have
complete understanding of an action for that action to be autonomous, but only an
adequate understanding. Complete understanding is an ideal which is very unlikely, if not
impossible, to achieve, and thus patients cannot be expected to have this ideal to execute
an autonomous action.7 They do, however, need to have adequate comprehension of all
6
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relevant details. Here, adequate comprehension means that the patient understands
enough about the procedure that they recognize the general medical reason for the
procedure and how it may give particular health benefits and present health risks.
Thirdly, autonomous action needs to be non-controlled by outside influences.
Faden and Beauchamp consider non-control also to be on a spectrum. At one end of the
spectrum is completely controlled action, which is defined as coercion. Coercion occurs
if someone influences another by threatening harm that renders the person unable to resist
acting to avoid it.8 Persuasion lies at the opposite end of the spectrum on the completely
non-controlled end. Persuasion occurs when one person influences another person with
factual input and their own advice in an open, non-clandestine appeal to reason, never at
the expense of a person’s own reasons or motivations.9 In the middle of the spectrum
between coercion and persuasion lies manipulation, where one person’s actions unduly
influence another’s autonomy by circumvention of that person’s ability to control their
own action. Manipulation is different from both persuasion and coercion because it is an
“influence of a person by non-coercively altering the actual choices available to a person,
or by non-persuasively altering a person’s perception of those choices.”10 Thus,
manipulation lies in the gray areas between persuasion and coercion. Examples of
manipulation include seduction, deception, and indoctrination.11 A person acting
autonomously is said to be non-controlled only if they are neither manipulated nor
coerced, and only persuaded, to act in a certain way.
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These are the basic necessities of any autonomous action; the specific autonomous
action of consenting to undergo a medical procedure must also have these three
necessities to be autonomous. The five elements of informed consent ensure that each of
these three elements of autonomous action is fulfilled. Since the five elements of
informed consent are rooted in the three elements of autonomous action, I will be able to
apply the five elements to the case of concurrent surgery to determine how informed
consent and concurrency are related.
As stated earlier, these five concepts of informed consent are disclosure,
comprehension, voluntariness, competence, and consent. Together these elements ensure
accordance of consent with the universal definition of autonomous action. Because of the
correspondence between the elements of informed consent and the elements of
autonomous action, authorizations of doctors to perform treatment fit the universal
definition of autonomous action if they also fit the definition of informed consent
according to these five elements.
Competence, one of the elements of consent, is the ability of someone to act
autonomously. The ability of a person to act autonomously corresponds to the element of
autonomous action of understanding because a competent person has the potential to act
autonomously, and thus has full ability to first understand a medical intervention and then
intend to do it. Competence is the physical ability to comprehend disclosure and consider
it according to one’s own reasons and beliefs. For example, children and the severely
mentally disabled are considered people not generally able give an autonomous consent
to treat because they lack the cognitive functioning necessary to accurately understand
and weigh the risks and benefits of a procedure. To respect autonomy, another person

29
(usually a family member or a healthcare power of attorney) needs to step in to make the
autonomous choice in the incompetent person’s best interest. Competence is a very
complicated concept, and there are many volumes and articles that attempt to define and
determine who has substantial competence.12 These considerations are not discussed here,
but the need for patient competence is still put forth in the case of concurrent surgery as
with all informed consents.
Disclosure and comprehension also are associated with understanding. Here,
disclosure consists of explaining and describing the proposed procedure, while
comprehension is when the patient processes this information correctly. In other words,
disclosure is communication of the knowledge necessary for understanding from doctor
to patient, while comprehension ensures that that information is received and processed
by the patient accordingly.
The next element of informed consent, voluntariness, corresponds to the
requirement of non-control of an autonomous action. If something is voluntary, it is not
under the influence of coercion or manipulation; it is acted only according to a person’s
own reasoning and the persuasive, but not manipulative, information and advice given
from the doctor.13
The last element of informed consent, actual consent, sometimes called
authorization, corresponds to the element of intentionality for autonomous action. This
step is the culmination of understanding a procedure and its risks. This final step includes
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a formal authorization, such as a signature, which signifies the autonomous agreement to
allow the doctor to proceed with the treatment.14
After first defining autonomy according to three elements, and second, specifying
my focus to autonomous action and not to autonomous persons, I have associated the five
elements of informed consent to the three elements of autonomous action. Now I will
apply these five elements of informed consent to the action of concurrent surgery to
determine how to proceed. Accordance of my argument with the five elements of
informed consent will guarantee that my course of action is consistent with the moral
principle of respect for autonomy.

The Need to Disclose Concurrency

Disclosure and comprehension are both necessary for understanding, which again
is defined as adequate comprehension of all relevant propositions and statements that
correctly describe (1) the nature of the action and (2) the foreseeable consequences of and
possible outcomes that might follow as the result of performing or not performing the
action.15 Since disclosure is necessary for understanding, when determining whether or
not an aspect should be disclosed in the informed consent process, it is necessary to
determine if that aspect affects the nature of the surgery or the surgery’s consequences.
I argue that concurrency, which is full or substantial overlap of one procedure
with another, fundamentally affects the nature of the surgery and is thus relevant enough
to the patient to be required for understanding of the procedure.
14
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Even if concurrency does not increase risk or improve patient outcomes, as shown
in chapter one, the need to disclose still exists because concurrency modifies the nature of
the surgery in all circumstances, no matter the outcome, thus, the need to disclose
concurrent surgery is independent of these expected outcomes. This means that if
continued research shows either a decrease or increase in risk, informed consent will still
be required. This does not invalidate the need to discover the true effects of concurrency:
the true effects, good or bad, will show whether or not concurrency increases the
possibility of harm to patients, and will thus show medical benefit of the procedure itself.
However, the need for informed consent is required no matter what that research
uncovers.
Concurrency affects the nature of a surgery by significantly modifying the
responsibility of the attending surgeon. This comes from the definition of an attending
surgeon by the American College of Surgeons as “the primary surgeon responsible for
the orchestration and progress of a procedure.” 16 The presence of multiple
responsibilities changes the role of the primary attending physician, and thus deeply
changes the nature of the operation itself.
Consider the plausible example of a serious event happening in one concurrent
surgery which requires the attending to switch from one patient’s operating room to
another’s. Here, the responsibility of the attending toward the first patient clearly
influenced the attending’s responsibility toward the second because the second procedure
needed to be temporarily suspended to help the first patient. These intertwining
16
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responsibilities affect the nature of each surgery, because in each case, the patient shares
the doctor’s full attention with another patient. Even if doctors can safely balance these
multiple responsibilities, the patient does not have the sole attention of the doctor that
they authorize to treat them. Disclosure of concurrency should be required in informed
consent so that this dual responsibility is made known to the patient.
Concurrency must also be disclosed because concurrency affects the patient’s
understanding of the nature of surgery. Without disclosure, patients assume that the
physician will be physically present during the whole operation, and they thus have an
inaccurate conception of surgery’s true nature. It is up to the physician to disclose his or
her actual presence, which may only include the critical portions of the procedure, so that
the patient better understands the true nature of the surgeon’s presence.
Evidence showing that patients do not understand the true nature of concurrency
without disclosure can be found in the public’s reaction to concurrency. Widespread
reactions of government, hospitals, and the general public indicate that many people were
surprised by the existence of concurrency in today’s medical practice. Furthermore, the
reaction to concurrency was largely negative - the practice itself was called into question.
In general, patients’ previous idea of the nature of surgery did not include concurrency,
and when the truth of concurrency was uncovered, widespread reaction occurred as a
result. Basically, if people are surprised when they discovered concurrency, and reacted
to it with disapproval and caution as they did, this indicates that their perception of the
nature of surgery was changed by their discovery of concurrency.
These specific reactions will be discussed in Chapter Three. Specifically, the
response of hospitals, of medical associations and governing agencies, and of the public
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to concurrency will be analyzed and categorized. For now, it is only important to know
that these reactions exist and give support to the fact that concurrency affects the nature
of surgery because it indicates inconsistency between patient expectation and reality.
In addition to disclosure, the other elements of autonomous action relating to
understanding still apply – these are competence and understanding. As discussed earlier,
competence is a highly debated element of informed consent, and I do not discuss what
makes a patient competent to consent here. Furthermore, a patient must not just hear
disclosure, but must also understand what that disclosure entails. The doctor still has the
responsibility to check for competence before disclosure, and understanding after. For
example, once the physician discloses concurrency, they must verify that the patient does
not misunderstand concurrent surgery as something else. They must also ensure that a
patient is competent to understand.

On the Possibility of Manipulation and Coercion

Informed consent also must be voluntary to be an autonomous consent.
Voluntariness specifically comes from the requirement of non-control in an autonomous
action. Both manipulation and coercion are forms of control of the patient. In other
words, disclosure of concurrency alone is not enough to guarantee that the decision to
operate concurrently is an autonomous decision. The attending physician also must not
manipulate or coerce the patient, and simple disclosure is not enough.
Firstly, a physician must not coerce the patient into agreeing to concurrent
surgery. Coercion occurs if someone influences another by presentation of a threat of
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harm that renders the person unable to resist acting to avoid it.17 In this case, if the
attending threatens the patient with any form of harm if the patient does not consent to a
concurrent surgery, even if the physician discloses concurrency, than the consent is still
not valid as autonomous. Here, the autonomy of the patient is hindered because the
patient is no longer able to make a free decision since their decision is controlled by
threat of harm. Coercion can occur in many ways, as any intentional threat to the
patient’s safety renders a decision nonautonomous, but generally, an instance of coercion
would occur when a doctor tells or implies to the patient that he or she will harm the
patient if they do not consent to surgery upon disclosure of concurrency.
Manipulation is less extreme than coercion, but still renders a patient’s consent
invalid and nonautonomous and thus also must be avoided. As stated earlier,
manipulation is where a person’s actions unduly influence another person’s autonomy by
circumvention of a person’s own ability to control their own action.18 An example of
manipulation related to concurrency is when a doctor purposefully expresses disdain or
unwillingness to discuss concurrency upon disclosure. For example, take the case of a
patient being unsure about undergoing a surgery when they hear that it will be
concurrent. Then, the doctor tells the patient that if they don’t agree with the
concurrency, that they can simply elect to not do the surgery and find another surgeon.
The doctor does not offer to help the patient find another nonconcurrent provider, does
not offer to change the schedule so that the surgery is nonconcurrent, and does not
attempt to persuade the patient to undergo the operation despite the concurrency. This is
manipulation because the doctor is using his or her ability to withhold lifesaving help to
17
18

Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 261.
Ibid.

35
the patient to manipulate the patient into consenting anyway. If the patient is pressured
into consenting by the doctor only because of this hassle and deception, then the patient’s
decision is not autonomous.
Physicians should also be aware of the potential for structural inequality to
increase potential for manipulation. Embedded in social structures, like wealth, class,
education level, and race, is an increased susceptibility to marginalization by others who
hold more social power through these same structures. For example, a patient who is
uncomfortable with concurrent surgery and has a low income and health insurance with
low benefits may be more apprehensive about consenting to a high-cost specialized
medical procedure. A lower amount of the above manipulation may unduly influence
them, showing increased vulnerability. Similar considerations for other social inequalities
must be considered.
Instead, if a patient is reluctant to undergo a concurrent procedure, the doctor
should persuade the patient to reconsider, perhaps by telling why the concurrency should
not affect the outcome of the procedure through explanation of the process, appeal to
empirical evidence, or clarification of its justice-based benefits. The doctor should
highlight that it is not essential for him or her to be physically present during the opening
and closing portions because the other doctors in the room are fully qualified to operate
despite the attending being elsewhere. If the patient is still resistant, despite the low
probability of adverse effects, than the doctor should respect the patient’s decision to not
undergo the concurrent operation. From here, the doctor should still attempt to provide
the patient with care, either by referral to another provider or by modification of
scheduling and plans so that the patient’s procedure is not overlapped. As stated, the
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doctor should not manipulate the patient into receiving concurrent surgery anyway by
threatening or implying that the patient will be harmed by not consenting. This would
lead to coercion or manipulation and would invalidate the consent.
In conclusion, informed consent is required to respect the autonomy of a patient to
choose their own destiny and to control their own health. I show that disclosure is
required in the case of concurrent surgery because concurrency affects the nature of the
procedure itself. This need to disclose is independent of the consequences of
concurrency. Furthermore, I maintain that in addition to disclosure, the doctor cannot
manipulate or coerce a patient into receiving concurrent surgery when the patient
expresses non-approval of the concurrency.
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Chapter 3: Current Responses to Concurrent Surgery

Concurrent surgery is a current issue in the public arena. The practice has only in
the past year or two come into the public eye as an issue worthy of exploring and
critiquing. Beforehand, concurrent surgery was a quiet and little talked about aspect of
surgery in large teaching hospitals. Hospitals, insurance companies, and regulatory
medical associations did not all include concurrency in the informed consent process, as
there was neither consensus nor discussion on whether or not the practice needed consent,
or whether or not it entailed risk.
The Boston Globe Spotlight report on concurrent surgery was the first to bring the
practice into consideration on the large public stage.1 After this initial report, public
debate and legislative action began. In addition, hospitals put forth official statements on
concurrent surgery and informed consent, and medical associations representing groups
of physicians put forth their own statements on the topic within their official principles of
healthcare. All of these responses constitute reactions to the issue of concurrent surgery
and informed consent, and each should be considered in the discussion on the
controversy.
In addition, these public reactions show that the average patient does not know of
the true nature of concurrent surgery. In the eyes of the everyday patient, concurrency
was not considered common practice, even though this is not true in many large teaching
hospitals. Furthermore, the largely critical response toward concurrent surgery and the
widespread calling for disclosure indicates that the nature of surgery is affected by
concurrency. Clearly, the large reaction indicates that the public thinks it is an important
1
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aspect of surgery because many patients did not know that the true nature of surgery may
include concurrency. All of this lends support for disclosure of concurrency.

The Public Response

The response to concurrent surgery and informed consent was large enough to
make hospitals institute and concretize their own policies, and for regulators and
professional organizations to state their own opinions and own reviews. However, all of
this was largely in response to the public outcry, which can be seen as the root cause of
regulatory, hospital, and governmental response.
One way to gauge public response is analyzing public comments to the Boston
Globe articles published about concurrent surgery, starting with the “Spotlight Report”
special investigation, and continuing with post-report updates. These comments are
numerous and primarily show disapproval of concurrent surgery. In an article about the
nation-wide practice of concurrent surgery outside of MGH, all of the 58 comments were
against concurrent surgery or for disclosure.2 Another report telling that Mr. Meng, the
patient in the Boston Globe article, did not win his malpractice suit had 55 of its 58
comments against concurrent surgery. Two of the 58 were neutral (not taking a side),
while the other 2 comments were in support of the jury’s ruling against malpractice.3
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Finally, only 1 of the 60 comments on an article reporting on the Senate Finance
Committee report on concurrent surgeries was not against the practice.4
It is important to note that these comments do not indicate much about
widespread opinion on the practice, as only those that feel strongly enough to comment
on these articles will actually do so. Furthermore, many of these comments can be
swayed by the bias in the article, which are all against concurrent surgery. However, the
lack of contradictory support foretells that in general, the people who read the Boston
Globe articles and are thus aware of concurrent surgery are likely to disapprove of the
practice.
Finally, Massachusetts was the first state to take legislative action as a result of
the debate of concurrent surgery and consent. After the widely shared Boston Globe
report, the governor signed an executive order telling state regulating agencies and boards
to review their rules and policies on patient safety protection. The regulating agencies
responded with a regulatory rule which was approved by the Massachusetts Board of
Registration in Medicine and needs to be approved by other state medical boards and the
governor before taking effect. The rule requires surgeons to document in the medical
record when they enter and exit surgeries to increase accountability with the Medicare
requirement that surgeons be present for the critical portions of overlapping medical
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procedures. The rule also requires that surgeons indicate a backup surgeon should they
have to leave an operating room early.5
It is important to note that this rule does not require consent of the patient for
surgeries that overlap in the opening and closing, but it does effectively prohibit surgeons
from overlapping the critical portions of the procedure with any portion of another. It is
important to note that this regulation was passed executively and not legislatively.
However, the fact that it was passed with little internal or external resistance and high
public support indicates that the public approves of regulating concurrent surgery. Thus,
this gives support to the second chapter’s argument for disclosure. In addition to the
public’s reaction, hospitals, Medicare/Medicaid regulators, and the Senate Finance
Committee also responded.

Medical Association and Medicare/Medicaid Response

Firstly, it is important to state the positions on concurrent and overlapping surgery
which medical associations and medical insurance regulators have taken. These
institutions are very important because they generally set healthcare precedents across the
United States. The American College of Surgeons (ACS) has a goal of setting “optimal
and ethical” standards of care by publishing general statements and statements of
principles.6 By accrediting healthcare providers, including hospitals and surgeons, as well
5

Jonathan Saltzman, and Jenn Abelson, "State Acts on Simultaneous Surgeries," The
Boston Globe, (January 7, 2016), accessed April 1, 2017,
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/
2016/01/07/massachusetts-require-surgeons-document-operating-room-comings-andgoings/2uIu1IDhmz4K8CRaJtL1vL/story.html.
6
American College of Surgeons, Statements on Principles.

41
as monitoring the implications of healthcare regulations, the ACS is an authoritative body
of surgeons on procedural and ethical issues relevant to surgery. Within its most recent
update of its statements on principles revised on April 16th, 2016, months after the
Boston Globe Spotlight report, the ACS took a definitive stance on concurrent surgeries.
In a section entitled, “The Operation - Intraoperative Responsibility of the
Primary Surgeon,” the ACS maintains that surgeons must be present for all key or critical
portions of a surgical case, thereby outlawing completely concurrent surgeries where the
two critical portions overlap.7 However, this extreme practice has never been a standard,
and is widely considered to be unsafe.
The ACS then goes on to distinguish between concurrent surgeries where only the
opening of the second surgery overlaps with the closing of the first, and where the critical
portion of surgery overlaps with the opening or closing of the first. In the first scenario,
the ACS says that the attending can leave the closing process to qualified surgeons in the
room, while in the second case, the ACS says that the attending surgeon must assign
immediate availability to another surgeon, meaning that another attending must be
designated. In both cases, the ACS says that the patient must be informed. Furthermore,
the code of conduct says that this practice should never take place if it hinders the timely
and seamlessness flow of either procedure.8
This statement of the ACS backs up my above stance on concurrent surgery and
informed consent. As I argued, according to core principles, the practice of concurrent
surgery can be safely carried out, as long as proper informed consent is received from the
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patient. My conclusion is consistent with the above suggested action of the American
College of Surgeons.
A second important stance relevant to concurrent surgery and informed consent is
Medicare and Medicaid regulations on concurrent surgery. The Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid (CMS), the federal bureau which oversees Medicare and Medicaid, develops
Conditions of Participation (COP) which care-giving institutions must follow in order to
be reimbursed by Medicare and Medicaid. Since Medicare and Medicaid are so widely
used, most of the hospitals and healthcare providers in the country comply with Medicare
and Medicaid standards in order to be reimbursed by Medicare and Medicaid.
According to these guidelines, within teaching hospitals the attending surgeon
must be present for all key or critical portions of the procedure. Furthermore, during noncritical portions of the procedure, if the attending is not immediately present, he or she
must be “immediately available” to return to the procedure.9 The report goes on to say
that when two procedures are overlapped, another attending physician must be designated
to immediately assist the resident or fellow in the first surgery should the need arise. 10
These guidelines are consistent with the ACS statement on principles, but are not
as extensive. In both cases, the attending physician cannot overlap the critical or key
portions of any two procedures, and in both cases, a backup surgeon must be designated
if the key portions of the second procedure are initiated before the first procedure has
ended. However, the Medicare/Medicaid guidelines do not mention anything of the need
for informed consent for either the “critical portion overlap” or for the “opening and
9
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closing overlap.” Because the CMS manual carries regulatory force (hospitals must
follow the guidelines to receive Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement), informed
consent is not yet regulated.

Hospital Response

Beneath broad federal regulation and professional recommendation are actual
care-giving institutions - hospitals across the nation which perform concurrent surgery.
No matter what the public regulators and professional organizations recommend for this
issue, it will be the hospitals and their surgical staff which ultimately change the practice
of concurrent surgery and informed consent. These reactions are largely a response to
increased public debate. Teaching hospitals which perform these surgeries were quick to
publish policies and explanations as to why concurrent surgery is used. This would
provide information for worried and concerned patients.
MGH, as the main target of the Boston Globe article exposing concurrent surgery,
is an interesting hospital to focus on since it bore the brunt of the criticism of the Boston
Globe article. The hospital itself published responses and policies on its website shortly
after the Boston Globe Report.11 MGH’s response is generally made up of two
components. Firstly, MGH explains why concurrent surgery happens at the hospital in the
first place. Here, the hospital cites five reasons, including trauma, optimal use of surgery
teams and rooms, access to specialized surgeons, timeliness and availability of services,
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and education of residents and fellows.12 These reasons are very similar to the justicebased arguments for concurrent surgery presented in the first chapter.
The second aspect of this response is the clarification of concurrent surgery in the
disclosure portion of the informed consent process. An updated consent form published
on the website reads:
Resident doctors, doctors in a medical fellowship (fellows) and students in
medical, nursing and related health care professions receive training here, and
may take part in my procedure/surgery. A team of medical professionals will
work together to perform my procedure/surgery. My doctor or an attending
designee will be present for all the critical parts of the procedure/surgery although
other medical professionals may perform some aspects of the procedure as my
doctor or the attending designee deems appropriate.13
Interestingly, this updated consent form clarifies many aspects related to concurrent
surgery without directly disclosing concurrency. A direct disclosure of concurrency
would explicitly say that the attending physician may also be the attending on another
surgical case. However, the current consent form only infers that an attending may have
another simultaneous case. It says that the attending will be present for critical portions of
a case while not mentioning that they may be in another operating room otherwise. It is
left to the patient to infer that the doctor may have another concurrent case, and thus this
consent does not adequately disclose concurrency according to the standard proposed in
chapter two.
It is important to note that the transparency of MGH on their actual policy is a
step in the right direction. A webpage is dedicated to providing an accurate description
and explanation to the practice within the hospital. Furthermore, the form does provide an
12
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opportunity for the patient to ask questions to the attending surgeon. However, despite
this transparency, which is directed at helping patients understand and know the true
nature of the surgery they are consenting to, the hospital fails to include explicit
disclosure of concurrency in its consent process. Until this is achieved, it is not
guaranteed that consent to undergo concurrent surgery is a fully autonomous action as
defined in chapter two.
The policies of many other hospitals have changed as a result of the increased
public debate as well. In December of 2016, the Senate Finance Committee released a
report on the practice of concurrent and overlapping surgery in the field.14 To do this,
they contacted 17 hospitals around the nation and asked them to describe certain aspects
of the practice as it takes place in their hospital, including permitted practice, the
definition of critical portion, disclosure to patients, the definition of “immediately
available,” arranging for a backup surgeon, and ensuring compliance with policy. The
results of are as follows.
Generally, most of the definitions and prohibitions of the hospitals align with
those of the American College of Surgeons. Again, here concurrent surgery occurs when
a critical portion of one surgery overlaps with another’s opening or closing, and
overlapped surgery is when overlap exists between opening and closing only. Overlapped
surgery was further clarified as when the surgeon had no reasonable expectation to return
to the first surgery, and concurrent surgery as when the assignment of a second surgeon
to oversee the first surgery was required. Fifteen of the 17 responses outright banned
14
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concurrent surgeries, while the rest either had different definitions of concurrent surgery
or did not explicitly ban them (although implicit disapproval may have been present). 15
The definition of the “critical portion” of a procedure also varied by hospital.
About half of the hospitals left the critical portion of the procedure open to physician
discretion (as did ACS and CMS guidelines), while the other half developed or planned
to develop a list of commonly overlapped surgeries with the critical portions explicitly
defined. One hospital said that there should be no explicit definition of the critical
portions to allow for technological and procedural development within the field.16
Generally, there should be consensus on the definition of the critical portion of any
procedure, whether that be through explicit definitions by the ACS or CMS, or by inner
or inter hospital agreement. If it is left up to the surgeon to decide the critical portion,
there needs to be a method of overseeing whether or not the surgeon’s practices remain
safe.
The Congressional Committee also looked into the informed consent policies of
these hospitals, and found that only 3 of 14 hospitals reviewed provided any disclosure
that the patient’s surgery was concurrent. In general, the other hospitals may have
disclosed that the attending would be present for key portions of the case, but left where
that surgeon would be open-ended.17 According to my defense of informed consent for
concurrent surgery, this clearly represents a shortfall in disclosure of concurrent and
overlapped surgery.
Notably, one hospital elected not to change its main consent form to include
concurrency, as only 1% of all surgeries in the hospital were overlapped. Instead, the
15
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hospital required its doctors to inform the patient only if their surgery was overlapped,
and once they did, to record it in the patient records.18 This brings up an important
concern of many hospitals, that the mention of overlap when there is none could unduly
concern patients. This method is one way to get around this problem, while another is to
only put the disclosure on the overlapped surgery consent forms, either by use of a
different consent form, or by requiring initialing only if applicable.
By the ACS and CMS guidelines, during concurrent surgery the doctor is required
to be immediately available should they not be physically present in an operating room,
whether they be in another procedure or elsewhere. The definition “immediately
available” also varies between hospital systems, possibly due to the lack of extensive
definition provided by ACS and CMS. Three hospitals did not define immediately
available, while about a third defined immediately available as being “on campus.” This
definition may lack consistency in practice because hospital campuses vary vastly in size
and department location. Another hospital said immediately was 5-15 minutes.19
Lastly, designation of a backup surgeon for concurrent surgery is uncommon, as
about half of the 17 hospitals analyzed did not require a backup surgeon to be assigned as
immediately available once the primary surgeon moved to the second surgery. This is in
discordance with the ACS rules, which recommend that a backup surgeon be present.
Importantly, however, the ACS rules do not carry the force of law, demonstrating that
hospitals may be reluctant to follow guidelines put forth by professional groups like the
ACS.
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All in all, the Senate Finance Committee Report shows that the actual hospital
policies which directly control the actions of surgeons toward their patients are
inconsistent with the ACS and Medicare/Medicaid rules which directly control the
actions of surgeons toward their patients. This is evident by lack of definition of terms
like “critical portion,” “concurrent surgery,” and “overlapping surgery,” and of what to
disclose in the consent process. A clear decision must be made on concurrent surgery and
informed consent, and this decision must be instituted in a way that is equally consistent
and regulatable across all hospital systems.
In addition, the Senate Finance Committee Report shows that the public has taken
notice of the issue of concurrent surgery as, for the first time, a national agency has
investigated the matter. The importance of concurrent surgery and informed consent to
such high ranking public offices shows that the issue has the potential to significantly
affect many American patients.
This also indicates that concurrent surgery does influence the nature of a
procedure significantly enough that it warrants consent. There was such a large public
reaction that the federal government began an investigation on the issue. People were
disgruntled enough at the difference between their perception of surgery and the true
nature of concurrency that their response prompted federal review.
Summarizing this discussion on the recent response to concurrent surgery, I have
shown how governmental agencies including the Senate Finance Committee and the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Systems have responded to public discussion and have
influenced hospital policy as a result. Generally, public response, especially to the Boston
Globe report on concurrent surgery at MGH has largely been negative. In response, the
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Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Systems’ rules on concurrent surgery, specifically
requiring physicians to be present for the critical portions of the procedure, has been
referenced by many hospitals in their responses. In addition, the American College of
Surgeons has changed their official guidelines to both prohibit concurrent surgeries
where the critical portions overlap, and to limit surgeries where the opening and closing
overlap. The Senate Finance Committee, in the largest review of the actual practice of
concurrent surgery to date, compared actual hospital guidelines to the CMS and ACS
guidelines. Their review shows a trend of hospitals toward limiting concurrent surgery,
but also uncovers large discrepancies between hospitals and ACS guidelines.
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Conclusion

I have argued that concurrent surgery should be allowed and that the patient
should need to give informed consent for it. First, I put forth four moral principles that
relate to this issue and to medicine in general. These are nonmaleficence, beneficence,
justice, and respect for autonomy, and each of these arises from the common morality and
should be universally recognized. I have put forth substantial empirical evidence
indicating that concurrent surgery does not increase risk of complications, showing that
the practice is consistent with nonmaleficence and beneficence because it does not
introduce significant risk. In addition, I have provided the justice-based benefits of
concurrent surgery. These include greater patient access -as doctors can increase their
patient load and surgery numbers - and potential to increase future physician training
through an increased number of well-trained doctors. These constitute a benefit to
concurrent surgery which bestows validity to the practice.
In my second chapter, I showed how respect for autonomy is the basis of the
informed consent process which attempts to ensure that a patient’s decision to undergo a
medical treatment is an autonomous action. To act autonomously in general, a person
must act with (1), intentionality, (2) with understanding, and (3) without controlling
influences. The five elements of the informed consent process include disclosure,
comprehension, voluntariness, competence, and consent. Each of these helps ensure the
three elements of autonomous action. Specifically, I argue that concurrency must be
disclosed and understood with an explanation as to why the procedure is done and how it
is safe. This is because concurrency fundamentally changes the nature of procedure
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because the primary attending will not be physically present for all of the procedure, only
the principal portions. This goes against the typical assumption that doctors are present
for the entire surgery, and thus to avoid confusion, the actual condition of concurrency
must be disclosed and explained so that the nature of surgery is clear to the patient.
After concurrency is disclosed, considerable measures should be taken to make
sure that the other four requirements of informed consent are met, including verification
of comprehension, competence, non-manipulation, and non-coercion of the doctor.
Comprehension and competence are needed to ensure that the patient understands the
action of surgery fully, while non-manipulation and non-coercion ensure that the action is
voluntary: without controlling influences.
Thirdly and finally, I discussed the reaction to the increased debate of concurrent
surgery, which included the negative response of the public to the practice, the
governmental response by the Senate Finance Committee, the response by an official
body of surgeons, and the shift in hospital policy toward clearer outlining of policy.
All in all, this analysis provides an ethically consistent argument for a particular
course of action for a practice that is in flux as the public, hospitals, and regulators
consider the issue for the first time. The first two chapters of my thesis attempt to come to
an ethical or course of action which can be used moving forward to determine proper
policy. The third chapter of my thesis attempts to summarize response to the topic in
order to form a base from which those involved in medicine can use to make future
decisions.
In addition, there are some important takeaways from this discussion on
concurrent surgery which could be useful in the future. Firstly, an increase in education
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would foster an easier informed consent process, especially with better scientific
education. This is true for the general education of the public and the better ability of
doctors to educate their patients. General education might increase patients’ ability and
motivation to understand the procedures being done to them because they would better
comprehend the reasons why. Ability and willingness to understand the risk, benefit, and
context of a medical treatment should yield more informed decisions that make
autonomous action easier.
Doctors should make a greater effort to educate patients and be open to them. The
doctor-patient relationship can only function with trust, and if an increasingly educated
public is not met with open, transparent medicine, the public may become increasingly
suspicious of doctors that hide the specifics of their work behind closed operating room
doors. The strong negative reaction of the public to the Boston Globe article highlighting
concurrent surgeries shows evidence for this instability. Also, doctors should not be
afraid of patient reaction to the truth. If patients trust their doctors enough to put their
lives in their hands, doctors should also trust that patients can understand and agree with
their procedures if they have good reasoning, as with the case with concurrent surgery. If
not, and the patients decide against a concurrency, they have every right to do so, as
patients have the right to act autonomously.
Secondly, more empirical studies on concurrent surgery should be undertaken to
ensure that the practice does not introduce risk in any specialty or hospital. For example,
a retrospective study across multiple hospitals including records from all departments and
surgery types would indicate whether any specific area of medicine shows increase risk.
In addition to the verification of non-risk, these studies could also be designed to show
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increased patient throughput efficiency and could show the justice-based benefits to the
practice. Studies could also be designed to evaluate the consent process for patients to
show what hospitals and doctors are telling patients.
Thirdly, those involved with the medical profession – regulators, healthcare
system decision makers, and physicians – should consider the transparency of healthcare
and how trust may be dependent on it. The issue of concurrency largely represents a
miscommunication between those who provide healthcare and those that receive it.
Although patients may not ever understand the process of surgery to the extent that
providers do, and may not need to to achieve adequate understanding of the nature of
surgery, providers clearly were not disclosing to patients an aspect of surgery considered
controversial by many. This hiding of details, either intentional or unintentional, may
erode patient trust as patients may believe that doctors are cutting corners or intentionally
hiding actions that patients may disapprove of. Without proper communication of this
information, skepticism of the intentions of doctors may grow and doctors could find it
harder to convince patients to accept medicine that could help them. Whether or not the
controversy of concurrency has negatively affected this trust in a measurable way has yet
to be seen, but others should seek empirical evidence to shed light on this potential effect.
Finally, steps should be taken to ensure that the proper course of action for
concurrent surgery is taken. The response of hospital policy to the governmental and
professional body recommendations for concurrent surgery should be carefully
monitored. As discussed, there should be explicit disclosure of concurrency and the
reasons for it. Hospitals may follow recommendations of the government and the
American College of Surgeons voluntarily. However, if hospitals are shown to ignore
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these guidelines by either practicing concurrent surgeries in an unsafe manner through
improper overlap, or by not requiring disclosure of concurrency in the consent process,
then regulatory action may need to be taken by either the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Systems, or by another executive body. Judicial and legislative action can also
be taken to ensure the same outcome.
In the end, I hope that policy makers, healthcare providers, and most importantly,
the patients that undergo concurrent surgeries can use my argument for concurrent
surgery and informed consent to arrive together at a decision that respects the best
interests of all.
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